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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COOMBS AND COMPANY OF OGDEN, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
JAMES E. REED, d/b/aj JAMES E. 
REED COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 8506 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were uranium stock brok-
ers, doing business in Utah. Defendant was engaged 
in underwriting the sale of Wyoming Uranium Cor-
poration stock. Defendant agre'ed to sell 100,000 shares 
of this stock to plaintiff, and pursu.ant thereto, plain-
tiff sold all 100,000 shares to plaintiff's customers at a 
price of 3c per share, or $3,000.00, and collected this 
money from the customers. (R-26). Plaintiff and de-
fendant contracted the sale and purchas·e of this stock 
as principals. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The contract price 
for the 100,000 shares was $2,760.00, which amount 
was tendered to defendant by plaintiff and accepted by 
defendant. (R-35). 
-----~ ,~, ---------------------
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Subsequently, def'endant breached the contract of 
sale and refused to deliver the 100,000' shares of stock. 
(R-39). Plaintiff did not purchase another 100,000 
shares on the market because it was not in a financial 
position to advance $3,000 of its own money for the pur-
chase of the stock at 6c per share. (R-52). Plaintiff 
then refunded its customers- money and entered this 
action against the defendant. To the date of the trial, 
no action had been instituted against plaintiff by the~e 
customers, and no custom'er had released plaintiff of 
liability for non-delivery of this stock. (R-51). 
Upon trial of the action, the trial court, Hon. David 
T. Lewis presiding, found plaintiff had suffered damages 
as a result of defendant's failure to deliver the stock in 
the amount of $3,240.00, which repres'ents the difference 
between the contract price and the market price at the 
date delivery should have been made. 
POINT 1 
THE PROPER l\fEASURE OF DAMAGES IK A~ 
ACTION FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER UNDER A 
CONTRACT OF SALE, IS THE DIFFERENCE BE-
rrWEEN CONTRACT PRICE AXD :JIARKET PRICE 
AT THE Til\IE DELIVERY SHOrLD HAVE BEEN 
:MADE. 
ARGU:M:ENT 
The Unifonn Sal·es Aet, Section 67, provides the 
1neasure of damage::::; to be applied in cases where the 
seller fails to deliYer the eontracted goods. This sec-
tion of the Unifor1n Sales Act is en1bodi·ed in Utah law 
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by Section 60-5-5, U. C. A. 1953, which provides as 
follows: 
Action for failing to deliver goods (1) Where 
the property in the goods has not passed to the 
buyer, and the seller wrongfully neglects or 
refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may main-
tain an action against the seller for damages for 
nondelivery. 
(2) The measure of damages is the loss di-
rectly and naturally resulting in the ordinary 
course of events from the seller's breach of con-
tract. 
(3) Where there is an available market for 
the goods in question, the measure of damages, 
in the absenc·e of special circumstances showing 
proximate damages of a greater amount, is the 
difference between the contract price and the 
market or current price of the goods at the time 
or times when they ought to have been delivered, 
or, if no time was fixed, then at the tin1e of the 
refusal to deliver. 
It will be noted that sub. (2) provides a general 
measure of damages that is to apply in the usual situ-
ation. Sub. (3) of this section provides for the measure 
of damages that will prevail in a specific situation, where 
there is an available market. Clearly, in a situation meet-
ing the requirements of sub. (3), the measure of dam-
ages specified therein will prevail over the general pro-
vision in sub. (2). This rule was announced in the case 
of Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., 164 NY Supp. 583, wherein 
the court stated: 
''That although, in an "action for failing to de-
3 
-~-,:: ____________ _ 
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liver goods," subdivision 2 of Section 148 pro-
vides that "the measure of damages is the loss 
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary 
course of events from the seller's breach of con-
tract," this is applicable to goods for which "there 
is an available market," as for the goods here in 
controversy, only upon taking into account the 
provisions of subdivision 3, by which the buyer 
of such goods is entitled to receive at least the 
difference between contract price and the market 
price at the time and place of delivery, and may 
recover a greater sum by pleading and proving 
special circumstances showing that his actual 
proximate loss was greater than that difference." 
(italics supplied.)" 
Norwood Lumber Corporation v. McKean, et al, 
3rd C.C.A., 153 F. 2nd 753, involving damages for fail-
ure to deliver, announced the san1e rule: 
"The measures of damages for failure to deliver 
goods contracted for is set out in the Uniform 
Sales Act which is la\v in Pennsylvania. Damages 
are given, under the statute, for the loss "di-
rectly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary 
course of events, fr01n the seller's breach of con-
tract." If there is an available market for the 
goods the rule as to dan1ages is crystallized into 
a rule that recovery is the difference between 
the contract price and the market price." 
Therefore, under Utah law, and the Uniform Sales 
Act, since the goods in question are shares of a corporate 
stock adively traded on the 1narket (R-39), it is sub. 
( 3) that will provide the 1ueasure of damages in this 
case. Sub. ( 3) expre~~·dy provides for the establish-
m·ent of damages greater than the difference between 
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contract price and market price, but makes no provision 
that damages can be less than that amount. 
The clear portent of this section is that when a 
seller fails to deliver, and there is an availabl-e market 
for the goods, the measure of damages can not be less 
than the difference between contract price and market 
price at the date the goods should have been delivered. 
Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadnock Paper Mills, 
(Mass.) 68 F. Supp. 714, was a case very similar to this 
one. In that case the plaintiff agreed to turn over all 
its orders for paper from a certain company to defend-
ant, and defendant agreed to deliver the paper so or-
dered. Plaintiff was to receive a commission of 3 to 
5% on these sales. The defendant refused delivery, 
and plaintiff sued for the difference between contract 
and market price, while defendant contended that plain-
tiff's only da1nages were the lost commissions. The 
court said: 
"(13) In the light of the construction put upon 
the agreements here, viz., that plaintiff's obliga-
tion was to turn over to the defendant all of 
Courier's No. 4 bond business and the defendant 
agreed to become the plaintiff's supplier for 
Courier's and other customers' requirements, it 
would appear that the plaintiff intended to put 
the paper to a limited and less advantageous use 
than selling it in the open market, although there 
is nothing in the main contract which specifically 
limits the plaintiff in its use of the paper to be 
purchased. It could sell it in the open market if it 
saw fit. There is authority to the effect that in 
such a case the buyer's damages would be limited 
to his actual loss. Cf Williston on Contracts (R'ev. 
5 
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Ed.) Sec. 1386, p. 3877. It is doubtful that Sec. 
67 of the Uniform Sales Act was considered in 
deciding these cases. Cf Isaacson v. Crean, Sup. 
165 N. Y. S. S. 218. Section 56 (3) of the ~lass. 
Sales Act, Gen. Laws, c. 106, Sec. 56 (Sec. 67 of 
the U niforn1 Sales Act), which provides that a 
buyer's "measure of damages, in the absence of 
special circumstances showing proximate dam-
ages of a greater amount, shall be the difference 
between the contract price and the rnarket or 
current price of the goods at the tilne when they 
ought to have been delivered ... (emphasis mine), 
compels the conclusion here that the measure of 
damages under Count 1 is not the loss of com-
missions but the difference between the contract 
and the market price." 
Another case with similar _facts decided under the 
Uniform Sales Act is Iron Trade Products Co. v. Wilkoff 
Co., Penn., 116 A 150. Defendant sold to plaintiff, and 
plaintiff contracted for resale. Defendant refused to 
deliver, and plaintiff sued, clain1ing the difference be-
tween contract price and market price, while defendant 
said the lost profits of the resale were the only damage. 
The court quoted Sub. (3) of the Sales Act, and then 
said: 
.. Defendant contends the rule of darnages above 
stated does not apply here because of plaintiff's 
contract for resale, and that in no event can plain-
tiff recover 1nore than would have been its pro-
fits thereon, . . . Defendant also cites Foss v. 
Heine1nan, 144 Wis. 146, 128 N. W. 881, which, 
while not in all respects parallel, 1nay see1n to 
support its contention. Even so, we can not 
follow it, in view of our own rule as above stated. 
Plaintiff's vendee was not a party to the con-
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tract in suit, nor mentioned therein; and, while 
the rails in qusestion were seemingly intended 
for hi1n, other like rails would have filled his 
contract. The fact that a vendee has resold the 
goods contracted for is of no Inoment unless made 
a part of the contract; for, if not, he is entitled 
to the benefit of his bargain, regardless of the 
disposition he may intend to Inake of the property 
involved . . . " 
Of like effect is the decision of Goldfarb v. Campe 
Corp., supra, wherein the court held that the defendant 
could not prove circumstances reducing damages below 
the differences between contract price and market price, 
saying: 
"That Section 148, subds. 2 and 3, do not authorize 
the renouncing vendor to plead or prove "special 
circumstances" showing that the proximate dain-
ages (e.g., the loss which the vendee necessarily 
sustained) was l'ess than the difference between 
the contract price and market price, even though, 
before the date for delivery arrived, the vendor 
offered to do that which would enable the vendee 
to have full and prompt performance and avoid 
any loss at all." 
If plaintiff had purchased replacem'ent stock on the 
market following defendant's refusal to deliver, there 
can be no question but that plaintiff's damages would 
be the difference between contract price and market 
price paid. The fact that plaintiff did not so purchase 
is of no moment, if there is an available market. For 
cases to this effect, we submit: 
Saxe v. Penokee Lumber Co. 54 N. E. 14 
Lady Ester Lingerie Corporation v. Goldstein 
21 So. 2nd 398 
Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., Supra 
7 
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Defendant claims the result of the trial court's 
ruling is to make litigants rich, rather than to make 
them whole. We submit this is not true. In the con-
tract of sale that existed between plaintiff and defend-
ant, plaintiff had the right to have delivered 100,000 
shares for $2760. This was a valuable right, a contract 
right, existing solely in plaintiff corporation, and not 
in plaintiff's customers or any other persons or parties. 
At the time of his refusal, defendant was obligated to 
deliver 100,000 shares then worth $6000 for only $2760. 
For reasons not apparent from the record, defendant 
refused delivery, thereby saving $3,240 by refusing to 
deliver the stock. Now defendant claims that plaintiff's 
rights under this contract were worth only the sum of 
$240 lost commissions. If defendant's contention were 
accepted, the effect would be to 1nake defendant $3,000 
richer as a reward for his own breach of contract. 
Defendant cites the cas'e of Texas Company v. 
Pensacola Maritime Corporation, 279 Fed. 19, 24 ALR 
1336, as authority for his contention. We submit that 
this case is no authority for that contention inasmuch 
as the case was not decided under the provisions of the 
Uniform Sales Act. The sanm objection applies to the 
case of Maryland Coal and Coke Company v. Quemahon-
ing Coal Company, 4th C. C. A. 176 Fed. 303, which was 
decided prior to enactlnent of the Uniform Sales Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The n1easure of da1nages applied by the trial court 
in this case is emTt)ct. In any case where an available 
n1arket for the goods in question is shown, dan1ages 
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could not be less than the difference between contract 
price and Inarket price. This result is both logical and 
just, because any lesser measure will deprive plaintiff 
of the benefit of his bargain. 
The damage plaintiff has sustained by reason of 
defendant's failure to deliver the stock is in the amount 
of $3,240, and the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
Attorney for Respondent 
2324 Adams A venue, Ogden, Utah 
9 
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Mailed two t~e copies hereof to DefeQ.Q.ant-Appellant' s 
attorney, .George~E. Bridwell,, Sufte <506 Judge Building, 
. . 
~Salt Lake City, Utah,- this ftj' . • d~y-~~, 1956. :~, 
. . ffl£. .. (3;_. . 0 ·. . ' 
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